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Abstract 
Gordon Tullock has been one of the most important founders and contributors to Public 
Choice. Two innovations are typical “Tullock Challenges”. The first relates to method: the 
measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social 
networks such as Facebook, Twitter, or to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to 
strong incentives by the governments to manipulate the policy consequences. In general 
“What is important, will be manipulated by the government”. To restrain government 
manipulation one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for 
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Gordon Tullock has without any doubt been one of the most vibrant and important founders 
and contributors to Public Choice. Everyone who ever met him must have been impressed by 
his gift to immediately engage everyone into high level scholarly arguments – which, in most 
if not all cases, the other person lost. Almost always, Gordon Tullock would propose a totally 
unconventional idea and make a wild policy suggestion. He is a real “innovative sceptic” 
coming up with “uncommon solutions”. 
When I first met Gordon he immediately criticized me concerning my “totally naïve view” 
about the population’s influence on politics. In particular, he claimed that there has never 
been a revolution successfully achieved by the citizens1. This was new to me; I was one of 
those romantic people believing in revolutions from below. 
Knowing that I come from Switzerland, Gordon immediately suggested that I should develop 
a better political system than democracy. I was rather flabbergasted; as most other people, I 
considered democracy, and in particular direct democracy, to be a sanctified institution. I did 
not have a clue how to improve on it. 
I greatly enjoyed these interactions with Gordon. They motivated me to think hard about these 
challenges but I must confess that I am far from Gordon’s originality in suggesting solutions. 
As I greatly admire Gordon, it is a great honour for me to have been chosen by the Board of 
the European Public Choice Society to present the First Tullock Lecture. 
 
I call “Tullock Challenges” open issues identified by the kind of thinking Gordon represents. 
I choose two innovations – as far as I am aware – Gordon did not deal with because they are 
quite recent. The first innovation is one of method: it has become possible to measure 
subjective well-being, or happiness. It is one of the noteworthy results of modern happiness 
research to demonstrate that such measurements make sense and are reliable. The possibility 
to measure happiness has had important policy consequences; countries like France or the 
United Kingdom now engage in policies designed to maximize happiness. 
The second innovation I deal with are the digital social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, 
to some extent Google, and other internet platforms. The policy consequences may be that 
revolutions from below appear to be possible now. The examples of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, 
as well as other Arabic countries and beyond, may point in this direction. 
The challenge is to understand what consequences these two innovations have for society – 
and what political measures can be used to make them beneficial for the people. While the 
two innovations are on a quite different level, there is nevertheless a common theme. I will 
argue that both innovations lead to strong incentives by the governments to influence the 
policy consequences. Indeed, I propose that “What is important, will be manipulated by the 
government”. Thus, I claim that governments will manipulate the happiness indicators and the 
digital social networks in their favour. This is a generalization of the well-known result from 
Social Choice Theory that all preference aggregations can be manipulated. 
Section I discusses the effect on politics of the innovation to measure happiness, and section 
II of the innovation of digital social networks. Section III inquires what can be done to 
mitigate or prevent manipulation by government and to help fulfil individual preferences. I 
will argue that we have to turn to Constitutional Economics2 and increase the possibilities for 
direct popular participation and introduce random mechanisms. Section IV closes by 
considering what Gordon Tullock teaches us with respect to these issues. 
 
 
                                                
1 See Tullock 1971, 1974, 1987. Public Choice contributions influenced by Tullock’s lead are 
for example Bernholz 1991, 1997, Wintrobe 1998, Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000. 
2 This is, of course, another major contribution by Gordon; see the major influence of 
Buchanan and Tullock’s (1962) book.  
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I. The Happiness Innovation   
  
A. Measuring subjective well-being 
Human beings want to be happy: this is the view most philosophers share. In particular, 
Aristotle stressed that happiness is a desirable goal of most people in all periods. The 
innovation thus does not relate to happiness as such but to the possibility of measuring it in a 
reliable way. Economists have traditionally assumed that utility cannot be measured. As a 
consequence, microeconomics was developed without the need to measure utility. Rather, it is 
assumed that individuals maximize their utility subject to constraints, which yields 
empirically testable propositions. In contrast, psychologists have for a considerable number of 
years measured happiness by carefully administered representative surveys. Only recently3 
economists have noted this innovation and have started to use the corresponding data4. These 
data are of good quality and can be used for serious econometric estimates. In particular, 
measured subjective happiness correlates highly and robustly with objectively measurable 
aspects most people associate with “true” happiness such as that happy people smile more, 
initiate more social interactions, are more energetic, flexible, creative and optimistic, and are 
less prone to commit suicide. 
Most studies in economics use “life satisfaction” based on carefully administered 
representative surveys5 capturing a longer run and cognitive self-evaluation of subjective 
well-being. In contrast, “happiness” relates to a short run, affective mode. However, in line 
with much of the scholarly literature, I use the terms “happiness” and “life satisfaction” 
interchangeably as long as no confusion arises. 
 
Today, happiness research has become a thriving field6. Interdisciplinarity is one of its major 
characteristics. In addition to psychologists and now economists, there are political scientists 
and sociologists involved in the field. The techniques of analysis are quite similar so that there 
is more extensive cross-fertilization than in most other areas of scientific inquiry. Arguably, 
European contributions are as important, if not more important, than American ones. 
 
B. Determinants of Happiness 
Some of the most important determinants of happiness are also relevant for policy. These 
factors refer to the simultaneous estimates and are similar for a large number of countries, 
quite irrespective of their income level. The results listed are marginal effects keeping all 
other influences constant. 
Economic determinants:  
- Higher income clearly produces more happiness but at a strongly decreasing marginal 
rate; 
- The unemployed are much less happy than are those having a job; 
- The self employed are happier than those working as employees despite the fact that 
they tend to work longer hours, carry more risk, and often earn less. 
- Giving and voluntary work raise the happiness of those engaging in these activities. 
                                                
3 A forerunner is Easterlin 1974. 
4 Examples are the General Social Survey, the European Social Survey, the German Socio-
Economic Panel, the British Household Panel, or the World Gallup Poll. 
5 Representative surveys are only one technique to measure subjective well-being. Other 
techniques are e.g. the Experience Sampling Method, the Day Reconstruction Method, the U-
Index, or brain scanning. 
6 See e.g. the survey articles by Oswald 1997, Frey and Stutzer 2002a, Dolan et al. 2008; and 
the monographs by Kahneman et al. 1999, Frey and Stutzer 2002b, van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2004, Layard 2005, Frey 2008. 
 4 
Social determinants: 
- Religious persons are happier than those not believing in God or in a higher power, 
and not attending religious ceremonies; 
- Family; 
- Personal relationships in the form of having friends and entertaining many social 
contacts raise happiness. 
Political determinants: 
- People are happier in democratic polities; they value the political participation 
possibilities in a constitutionally guaranteed process above and beyond outcomes (they 
reap procedural utility). 
- The more decentralized the political decisions, i.e. the closer they are to the citizens, 
the happier people are.  
- “Good government” contributes to happiness. 
Psychological effects: 
- Human beings evaluate their own happiness level relative to other persons. They 
compare themselves to reference groups endogenously chosen. In particular, when 
individuals experience higher income, they compare themselves to other persons 
whose income also might have risen. 
- People adapt to new circumstances. In the extreme, this leads to the “Easterlin 
Paradox” suggesting that economic growth does not raise happiness as people 
continually and fully adjust their expectations upwards.  
 
C. Policy Conclusions 
Based on the insights from happiness research, a number of prominent scholars, such as 
Robert Frank, Richard Layard or Andrew Oswald, but also politicians such as French 
President Sarkozy, British Prime Minister David Cameron, as well as the People’s Republic 
of China, conclude that governments should use these results to “maximize happiness”. Even 
earlier, the Kingdom of Bhutan decided to maximize Gross National Happiness instead of 
Gross National Product (see Ura and Galay 2004). 
A number of concrete policies have been suggested but it suffices here to mention two of 
them to capture their gist.  
- Due to the insight of happiness research that individuals tend to compare themselves to 
others, those experiencing an income increase impose a negative external effect on other 
persons. This produces a rat race in which nobody is better off despite investing much effort 
to keep up with the Joneses. Scholars such as Frank (1999) and Layard (2007) propose to 
(heavily) tax these external effects by equalizing incomes. 
- Unemployed persons are much less happy than employed ones but this effect is mitigated 
when the unemployed live in areas in which many other persons are unemployed. It follows 
that a happiness maximizing policy should focus on areas with little unemployment as it is 
there where people feel the most unhappy. It follows that policy makers should be less 
bothered by the pockets of high unemployment, as people there are less unhappy than those in 
areas with little unemployment. 
 
D. Arguments against the government maximizing happiness 
There are various sets of arguments why governments should not pursue the goal of 
maximizing an index representing people’s happiness. They have been expounded in Frey and 
Stutzer (2010) and need not be repeated here. In the context of the “Tullock Challenges” the 
major counterargument against government maximizing happiness is that it will manipulate 
the happiness index. 
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Proposition 1: As soon as the happiness index has become an official goal of government 
policy, the government will manipulate it. 
 
Such behaviour is not surprising - at least to a political economist - but it has nevertheless 
been largely disregarded when it comes to government policy.  In the social sciences a similar 
idea is known as Campbell’s Law (1976) stating that the more intensively a quantitative 
indicator is used for policy purposes, the stronger it is subject to distorting and biasing social 
processes. In economic theory, the informational aspect has been pointed out in Goodhart’s 
Law (1975). It suggests that once an economic indicator, in particular the stock of money, is 
made an economic policy target, it will lose the information content that would qualify it to 
play such a role. The Lucas Critique (1976) states that the structure of an econometric system 
tends to break down when policy interventions are undertaken. Power (1997), Strathern 
(2000) and Osterloh and Frey (2010) analyze the reactivity of persons when they are 
subjected to audits, rankings, and other assessments. Jacob and Levitt (2003) show that 
schools subject to standardized tests give them incentives to cheat, such as “teaching to the 
test”, or excluding weak students from attending when the test takes place, or excluding them 
from the school altogether. Espeland and Saunders (2007) empirically study the response of 
American business schools to their rankings undermining their usefulness. All this reminds of 
the fundamental problem in preference aggregation that all democratic voting schemes that 
purport to choose a winner from at least three candidates can be manipulated (Gibbard 1973, 
Satterthwaite 1975, for a recent account Szpiro 2010). However, in contrast to the above 
proposition, social choice theory does not focus on a particular actor’s incentives to 
manipulate. 
Governments have for a long time influenced aggregate policy indicators, or used “creative 
accounting” in their favour (see e.g. the evidence in von Hagen and Wolff 2006, Dafflon and 
Rossi 1999, Forte 2001). Many different governments have manipulated the size of GNP by 
introducing parts of the shadow economy into the official measure, or by just assuming 
particular changes in the productivity of the public sector. During the recent Euro-crisis, 
several governments have demonstrated that budget deficits and the size of the public debt 
can be easily utilized for one`s own purpose. The possibilities to manipulate the happiness 
index are considerably larger than for public sector indicators because it is based on 
representative surveys of subjective evaluations. It is quite easy to distort representativeness 
in favour of the government, e.g. by excluding unhappy persons who are difficult to reach 
(such as the homeless). The index can also be manipulated by excluding or including persons 
only staying in the country for a limited time period, who are defined to be ”mentally ill”, or 
who are incarcerated. Outliers, e.g. persons stating that their life satisfaction is “abysmally 
low”, can be excluded by arguing that their answers are not to be taken seriously. In fact, 
governments exhibit a great amount of ingenuity to manipulate indicators in their favour. 
Even if for some reason it was not possible or suitable to manipulate the existing happiness 
index, governments have a way out. They can introduce a new happiness indicator claiming 
that it captures the relevant or “true” happiness of the population in a better way. In actual fact 
they introduce it because it is more favourable to the politicians in power. For instance, a new 
happiness indicator can be constructed giving more weight to people with low income, or 
with unfortunate life experiences, provided the government believes to be able to increase 
their happiness and to therewith demonstrate that it is successful.  
 
F. Consequences 
What is important will be manipulated.  Politicians pursuing their own goals of personal 
power, recognition, ideology, and income, and seeking to stay in government, have a strong 
incentive to manipulate the happiness index they claim to maximize. The result is that such a 
policy does not correspond to the preferences of the population. Rather, it leads to a 
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systematic deviation from this democratic goal, and obfuscates the performance of 
government. I therefore conclude that governments should not maximize happiness. In section 
III I try to indicate in what ways government can use the insights of happiness research to 
improve the lot of the population. 
 
II. Digital Innovations and Revolutions 
 
A. Digital Social Networks 
Over the last years, the surveillance by CCTV has expanded rapidly. In some countries such 
as Italy and the United Kingdom, many people are continually monitored. Google’s “street 
view” goes in the same direction. This raises a government’s ability to control its population 
and to prevent any signs of discontent with its policy. 
Internet forums, or “digital social networks” such as Facebook, Twitter, and to some extent 
Google, as well as Wikileaks are often claimed to be “democratic instruments”7 helping 
citizens to regain their position vis-à-vis government. The digital social networks facilitate an 
exchange of views between a wide set of persons at very low or no entry cost, and are open to 
anyone. It seems to be close to the philosophical idea of an unconstrained discourse 
(Habermas 1996). This democratic function has become visible in the revolutions recently 
taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the anti-government demonstrations in several 
other countries including the People’s Republic of China.  
 
B. Government manipulations 
Digital social networks are an innovation which does not only serve individuals to express 
and discuss their opinions but also presents new opportunities for the politicians in power to 
manipulate information and to control the population.  
 
Proposition 2: Governments have an incentive to manipulate the digital social networks in 
their favour. 
   
There are four major avenues for governments to exploit the internet innovations to further 
their own goals (see also Morozov 2010): 
- Persons active on the internet do not only interact with other users but can also be 
identified by the police and secret service. As a consequence the use of these 
platforms is dangerous. 
- Independent suppliers of internet information such as Wikileaks can be haunted, 
persecuted and silenced and internet providers not conforming to the wishes of the 
government can be shut down (see Economist February 12th, 2011). 
- Governments can capture the internet by employing professional pro-government 
bloggers. As a result, the digital social networks are undermined. 
- Finally, governments can use the possibilities provided by the internet to divert 
attention form politics. It can provide attractive films, video clips, sporting events, 
celebrity news or pornography shows so that the incentive to demonstrate or revolt is 
decreased or vanishes altogether. There is concrete evidence from the former German 
Democratic Republic (Kern and Hainmueller 2009) that such “opium for the masses” 
may indeed work. At that time, parts of the country were able to receive TV channels 
from West Germany, while other parts did not and could only consume the incessant 
and boring propaganda from the communist rulers. One would expect that those who 
every evening could see the far higher living standard and freedom in the West would 
be more opposed to the GDR government. In fact the opposite was true. East Germans 
                                                
7 For example by the US government; see Economist Jan 8th, 2011: 74-5. 
 7 
exposed to West German TV were more satisfied with life in East Germany (they, for 
instance, made fewer applications for exit visas). This seemingly paradoxical result 
can be attributed to TV primarily being a source of entertainment. Television viewers 
did not threaten the Communist government because they were too much occupied 
vicariously consuming the Western life style.  
This case suggests that governments may actively use digital platforms to provide 
entertainment and to dampen political unrest. The idea that “no dictator in the world can 
stop Facebook” (a recent title in a German newspaper) is naïve – and Gordon Tullock 
would certainly be one of the first to agree with that verdict. Governments have indeed a 
strong incentive to manipulate internet innovations. 
It could be argued that the recent events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya indicate that the 
existing digital social networks helped to topple dictatorial governments. This is true but 
might be the exception rather than the rule. The means of internet communication are  
relatively recent innovations and the respective Arab governments were therefore not 
sufficiently prepared to counter the danger. It may also be argued that these dictatorships 
were technically and mentally incapable of meeting this challenge. It must, however, be 
assumed that other authoritarian governments will quickly learn once they realize how 
dangerous digital social networks can become to them. Moreover, it is not clear whether 
revolutions based on digital networks are really effective. The activity induced takes place 
at an individualistic level and reflects “flash campaigns” devoted to ever-new issues. In 
contrast, the establishment of a new, more democratic, government must be based on a 
dependable and stable constitutional framework.  
 
C. New Digital Equilibrium 
Internet fora are an innovation at the same time raising the possibility of individuals to 
politically express their preferences and of governments to counteract and to influence 
individuals. It is therefore mistaken to assume that this innovation is a unique force 
furthering revolutions from below. Gordon Tullock’s scepticism with such “romantic” 
views holds also in the age of digital social networks. Public Choice scholars have the task 
to analyze the determinants of the new equilibrium driven by the digit innovation. The 
conditions under which the innovation can be exploited by the individuals and the 
politicians in power need to be carefully identified. This presents a major challenge. 
 
III. How to Restrain Government Manipulation? 
 
A. Independent bodies 
The innovations produced by the ability to measure happiness and to engage in digital 
social networks enlarges governments’ scope to manipulate individual preferences. The 
only way to check this incentive is to change the rules of the game. One possibility is to 
establish independent political bodies (see Eichenberger and Schelker 2006). The idea of a 
judicial branch independent from government is part of the classical division of power. 
More recently, central banks have been given a status of independence vis-à-vis the 
government. To prevent the manipulation of the happiness index (as well as of other 
macroeconomic indicators) one might establish an independent statistical office. To 
prevent the manipulation of digital social networks one might establish an independent 
telecommunications agency. 
It is doubtful whether bodies can be constructed which are really independent of the 
government, in particular in countries without such traditions. This even applies for central 
banks. There are only very few in the world which cannot be forced by the politicians in 
power to follow their wishes and orders. Governments often manipulate formally 
independent central banks. Even if the independent bodies are able to maintain their 
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discretion with respect to the tasks assigned to them, governments find it easy to 
circumvent them. A statistical office in charge of the happiness index finds it difficult to 
prevent governments from introducing a new, more favourable index. A 
telecommunications agency can hardly prevent governments from interfering in new ways 
with digital social networks. It is therefore advisable to look into more fundamental 
constitutional rules to restrict the manipulation of the population by governments. Section 
B proposes stronger political participation possibilities, and Section C a more extensive use 
of random mechanisms. 
 
B. Stronger political participation possibilities 
Authoritarian systems as well as representative democracies are prone to give professional 
politicians extensive powers. A “political class” emerges which tends to act in its own 
interest while disregarding the wishes of the population. Empirical research in Public 
Choice (see in particular Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz 1999) has demonstrated that 
extending the popular participation rights of the citizens via initiatives, referenda and recall 
may considerably restrain government. The same holds for the decentralization of political 
decisions in traditional federalism and newer forms (such as e.g. FOCJ, see Frey and 
Eichenberger 1999). These constitutional rules lead to more fully informed and active 
citizens (as empirically shown by Benz and Stutzer 2004), and to more confident citizens8 
who are better able to resist government manipulations. They are more aware of a 
government's intention to modify or exchange the happiness indicator as well as of the 
extent to which it interferes with the digital social networks. 
 
C. Random mechanisms 
The use of probabilistic elements in politics can be seen as an extension of democracy. In 
contrast to a traditional definition of democracy focused on the right to vote, it leads to a 
closer reflection of individual preferences in political bodies and decisions. It can be 
considered a disregarded form of government in the tradition of Gordon Tullock. 
Random selection mechanisms allow an exact representation of citizens’ preferences and 
undermine the attempts of governments to manipulate their citizens. Moreover, it saves the 
increasingly large cost of running a voting system consisting in the monetary expenditures 
for an election campaign, as well as in the attention devoted by reigning politicians and 
their contenders. Random selection may be used widely: to choose the members of 
parliament either of one or of both chambers; the executive at the various levels of 
government; and the judiciary. 
Random systems are not totally new. Indeed, in antiquity various city-states, in particular 
Athens, employed them to prevent corruption and violence in election campaigns. In 
Venice, the doges were elected by a combination of random selection and votes. In some 
countries, juries are selected by lot, as are the “Planungszellen” in Germany and “Citizens 
Juries” in the United States and Australia. Many political bodies use the lot in order to 
reach a decision when there is an equality of votes.  
The idea is also rooted in democratic political theory. Aristotle in his Politeia (book 4) 
even takes the choice of rulers by lot as the only democratic one; he considers elections to 
necessarily be oligarchic. In Public Choice theory random referenda (Frey 1969), 
probabilistic models in social choice (Intriligator 1973) and in models of voting by veto 
(Mueller 1978) have been suggested. An extreme champion of random mechanisms in 
politics is Burnheim (1985) who wants to abandon elections by voting as the representation 
of the will of the citizens (Rousseau 1762) altogether. Burnheim discusses several possible 
                                                
8 As Frey and Stutzer (2000) empirically show, citizens in more directly democratic units are 
c.p. happier which further activates them. 
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objections (pp. 164-179). Most of them resonate those raised against direct democracy. 
Randomly selected citizens are said to lack competence and interest to engage in politics, 
and they tend to be dominated by experts and bureaucracy. Demarchic bodies are 
moreover not accountable because its members are not eligible for reappointment9.  
These arguments against random choice in politics are only partly valid and should be 
compared to the problems of electoral democracy such as the emergence of a “class 
politique” pursuing its own goals rather than those of the population, or the restrictive 
effect of the need for re-election to induce the politicians to act in the interest of the 
citizens. As has already been pointed out, in countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France or Germany election campaigns cost huge amounts of money, and 
deviate a considerable share of the attention of politicians from problems of great 
importance to the population. Elections also provide an excellent avenue for special groups 
to exert undue influence. It cannot be denied that, at least on average, randomly chosen 
citizens are less educated than average politicians, and perhaps also less interested in 
political affairs. However, it should not be forgotten that the politicians chosen by lot can 
use the advice provided by experts and public officials, i.e. they do not need to be 
technically competent. Their task is to evaluate alternatives in the light of their preferences 
and life experience10. If missing competence was indeed the crucial issue, a democracy 
such as Switzerland relying on the citizens deciding about all major issues by referenda, 
would have failed long ago. The opposite is the case11. This suggests that the idea of 
random elements to better reflect the preferences of the population should be taken more 
seriously than it has been. 
 
IV. What Can we Learn from Gordon Tullock? 
 
There are three aspects where we can directly profit from Gordon Tullock’s way of 
looking at the world: 
- “The world is changing, and politico-economic analysis should be aware of the 
innovations occurring”. Here I have chosen the measurement of happiness and the 
emergence of digital social networks as examples. 
- “Do not be naïve”. Innovations do provide new options to further democracy, but it 
should not be overlooked that, at the same time, they offer new possibilities for 
governments to manipulate the population. It has here been argued that governments 
will manipulate the happiness index as well as digital social networks. 
- “Seek new solutions”. Proposals should be made to go beyond the existing 
constitutional setting. The government’s incentives to manipulate the happiness data 
and the digital social networks should be restrained by extending the direct political 
participation rights of the citizens. Random elements should play a larger role in the 
legislative, executive and juridical branches of government. These changes help the 
citizens to be better informed, to be more self-confident, and to prevent the emergence 
of a political class serving its own interests. 
 
                                                
9 A useful survey of aleatoric democracy is provided by Buchstein (2009); the relationship to 
anarchy is discussed in Martin (1995-6). 
10 The German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger aptly quipped that professional politicians 
are the only people who never did any serious work; their life consists of sitting in 
meetings and giving more or less competent talks and interviews. 
11 Switzerland is usually ranked second in happiness rankings (behind Denmark), has a high 
standard of living, is well organized and is very attractive to immigrants. 
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This paper has been inspired by Gordon Tullock’s example which I am proud to follow but 
incapable to match.  
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